Limitations on Rule 10b-5 by Marinelli, Arthur J., Jr.
Volume 80
Issue 2 Numbers 2 & 3 Article 5
January 1978
Limitations on Rule 10b-5
Arthur J. Marinelli Jr.
Ohio University
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arthur J. Marinelli Jr., Limitations on Rule 10b-5, 80 W. Va. L. Rev. (1978).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss2/5
LIMITATIONS ON RULE 10b-5
ARTHUR J. MARINELLI, JR.*
The federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934 sought to protect
the investing public against fraud and manipulation by replacing
the doctrine of caveat emptor with a system of full disclosure.'
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the
Securities and Exchange Commission the power to promulgate
rules in order to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance."2 In 1942 the Commission adopted rule 10b-51 to im-
plement the "catch-all" provision of section 10(b) 4 which can be
viewed as a grant of wide-ranging discretion to the SEC.
Although all of the elements necessary for recovery in a 10b-5
action are not yet settled, the general requirements have been
identified by the courts:5 that the defendant come within the juris-
* Professor of Business Law, Ohio University. B.A., Ohio University, 1964;
J.D., Ohio State University, 1967.
1 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection
of investors.
3 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1974) [hereinafter referred to as rule 10b-5] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LwR. 793, 922 (1967)(Milton Freeman drafted rule 10b-5).
I A case which sets forth a good review of the necessary elements for recovery
is Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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diction of the rule;6 that the proscribed activities be "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security;7 that the defendant pos-
sess the necessary scienter; s that there exist an "untrue statement
of a material fact;"9 that there exist a causation-in-fact; ° and fi-
nally, that a security be involved."
The cause of action impliedly granted by rule 10b-5 has often
given plaintiffs a better chance of recovery than have traditional
state remedies. Other advantages of a 10b-5 action soon became
apparent to investors. The statute of limitations under rule 10b-5
is more favorable than other federal securities provisions since it
is subject to the generous time periods of state statutes; the tolling
of the statute, however, is a matter of federal law rather than state
law. 2 Rule 10b-5 is a broad antifraud provision in the federal secur-
ities laws: it prohibits fraud, misrepresentation, half-truths, con-
cealment of after-acquired information and omissions." It applies
to conduct in many areas, including insider trading," exchange
and tender offers, 5 mismanagement, 6 market manipulation,
Rule 10b-5 merely requires an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). A comparable requirement is contained in §
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
6 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1973). For a discussion of the "materiality" doc-
trine, see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1965). See, e.g., TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Herbest v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972),
where the Court stated that in "the circumstances of this case, involving primarily
a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery....
This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the
requisite element of causation in fact."
,1 See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). In
this case the court held a pyramid sales plan to be a security; United Hous. Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (stock of cooperative housing project not
security within meaning of securities laws).
" See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965); Martin, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Which State
Statute Is Applicable 29 Bus. LwYR. 443 (1974); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L. J. 1125, 1142-1150 (1972).
11 These are common lob-5 violations. SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co.,
324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), affl'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
" See Comment, Insiders Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for the Illegal Purchase
of Activitely Traded Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864 (1969).
IS See Dugan and Fairfield, Chris-Craft Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.: Liability
in the Context of a Tender Offer, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 412 (1974).
[Vol. 80
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RULE 10b-5
broker-dealer activities,"5 and fiduciary activities."
Although there is no language in either section 10(b) or rule
10b-5 which expressly provides for a private cause of action for
damages, ever since the seminal case of Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Company twenty federal courts have recognized a private
cause of action, which right is now firmly established.2 Judge
Kirkpatrick set forth in the Kardon case two theories upon which
an implied right of action is based. The first theory posited that
"disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort, " 2 the second that violation of "a statutory enactment that a
contract of a certain kind shall be void almost necessarily implies
a remedy in respect of it."2
Because there are so many advantages to using the rule, "10b-
5 is generating almost as much litigation as all the other general
antifraud provisions together, and several times as much as the
express liabilities. 24 Increasingly, however, courts have placed
limitations on the reach of rule 10b-5.2 In addition to establishing
purchaser-seller standing rules, scienter standards, and material-
ity requirements, courts have set standards of conduct for plain-
tiffs.28 Suits have in a few cases been barred by application of the
" See Jacobs, The Role of SEC Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of
Mismanagement, 59 CoRNELL L. Rzv. 27 (1973); Comment, The Liability of Outside
Directors Under Rule lob-5, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 551 (1974).
11 See Green v. Jonhop, 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973); Jacobs, Regulation
of Manipulation by SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.Y.L.F. 511 (1973).
"1 See Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-
Dealers, 57 CoRNuLz L. REv. 869 (1972).
" Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Comment, SEC
Rule 10b-5: Constructive Fraud and the Liabilities of Fiduciaries 35 Omo ST. L.J.
934 (1974).
' 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss); 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) (on the merits); 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (findings of fact and law).
11 See, e.g.; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9. (1971).
22 69 F. Supp. at 513.
2 Id. at 514.
24 See 1 A. BROMBERo, SEcunrrms LAw: FRAUD § 2.5(6) (1973). See also, SEC
v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969), where the Court stated that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act "may be the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws."
21 For a discussion of limiting federal control of internal corporate affairs under
rule 10b-5, see Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. R-v. 185 (1964). See also Brom-
berg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5? 29 Bus. LwYR. 167 (1974).
28 See Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5,
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in pari delicto defense,2 and in at least one case an action was not
allowed under 10b-5 when a state remedy was available.2 1
PURCHASER-SELLER STANDING RULE
The Supreme Court has limited the class of plaintiffs in a
private damage action under rule 10b-5 by its holding in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.29 There the Court for the first time
affirmed the "purchaser-seller" rule laid down in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corporation. This rule limits standing to sue under
rule 10b-5 to those plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities
actually involved in the alleged fraud. In the Blue Chip case, the
plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities, but they
claimed to have been persuaded not to purchase stock because of
fraudulent misrepresentations in the prospectus.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehnqu-
ist,31 held that an offeree who had neither bought nor sold any of
the shares offered in an allegedly misleading prospectus could not
maintain a private action for money damages under rule 10b-5. 2
The majority based its decision on an admittedly vague legislative
history, the long-standing acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by
virtually all lower federal courts,3 and finally what they described
as "policy considerations."3
The Court concluded that congressional failure to reject
Birnbaum, when it would have been a simple matter to amend
section 10(b) so as to include fraud "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security,"3
was an important argument for accepting the purchaser-seller re-
1975 DUKE L.J. 753 (1975).
7 See James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, Rule 10b-
5: The In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses, 58 CAL. L. REv. 1149 (1970).
The in pari delicto defense bars recovery by a plaintiff who has knowingly taken
part in the defendant's wrongdoing. In securities cases this would most often in-
volve plaintiffs who knowingly use "inside" information.
n Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
- 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
- 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
31 In the six-three decision Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Powell
joined in the opinion.
32 421 U.S. at 755.
33 Id. at 731.
11 421 U.S. at 737.
1 Id. at 732 (emphasis deleted).
[Vol. 80
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RULE 10b-5
quirement. 8 The opinion also noted that when Congress had speci-
fied in the 1933 and 1934 Acts the class of plaintiffs that could
bring private actions, it had not extended the right to sue to per-
sons not deemed to be purchasers or sellers of securities."
The Court found it proper to consider policy arguments where
congressional enactment and administrative regulations did not
offer conclusive guidance. 8 The inconclusive nature of the underly-
ing legislative history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as "to the
contours of a private cause of action"39 is pointed up in remarks
like those by Senator Fletcher, who stated that the purpose of the
1934 Act was "to insure to the public that the security exchanges
[would] be fair and open markets."" The Court noted that since
the judiciary itself had implied and developed the cause of action,
the judiciary must decide who might bring suit under the rule.41
The policy argument which seemed to be an overriding concern of
the majority was a "widespread recognition that litigation under
rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree
and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general."',2
The vexatious litigation which concerned the Court was the nuis-
ance lawsuit 3 which would impede business activity, force settle-
ments of unmeritorious claims, and possibly involve costly and
abusive discovery procedures. In the absence of the Bimbaum rule,
the Court feared that the outcome of a suit for securities fraud
would turn largely on which testimony the jury might believe."
Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion stated that the
fears of the majority were speculative and that sensible standards
of proof of fraud, causation, and damages would arise to distin-
guish the meritorious claims from the frivolous. 5 He argued that
the Court exhibited "a preternatural solicitousness for corporate
well-being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public
quite out of keeping . . . with [the Court's] own traditions and
Id. at 733.
Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 737.
' Id.
,0 78 CONG. REc. 2271 (1934).
421 U.S. at 737.
,2 Id. at 739.
13 Id. at 740-41.
" Id. at 743.
,' Id. at 770-71. Justice Blackman was joined in his dissent by Justices Bren-
nan and Douglas.
5
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the intent of the securities law." 8 The dissent thought the lan-
guage of section 10(b), which proscribes fraud by "any person,"
and rule 10b-5, which proscribes fraud by any "person" upon "any
person,"47 suggested that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
need be a purchaser or a seller. The dissent argued that fraud must
be connected with the transaction and that fraud need only be "in
connection with" the transaction and not a part of the transaction
itself.
The Blue Chip case affirmed the purchaser-seller rule of the
Birnbaum case in the context of an action for money damages.
After Birnbaum the courts developed a number of extensions and
modifications of the purchaser-seller rule. 8 The majority opinion
in Blue Chip indicates that further liberalization of the existing
modifications of the Birnbaum rule will not be favored and that
even accepted modifications may be in jeopardy. The Court noted
that it had previously held that the purchaser-seller rule does not
limit the right of the SEC to seek injunctive relief."8 The decision
in Blue Chip should not affect the aborted-transaction rule, which
involves a plaintiff who has entered into an agreement to purchase
or sell securities but who is prevented from completing the transac-
tion because of a defendant's fraud. The aborted-transaction rule
is based on a statute which provides that a plaintiff holding a
contract for the purchase or sale of securities is considered to be a
purchaser or seller. It is difficult to predict with certainty the out-
come of a case involving a forced seller, but strict adherence to the
Birnbaum rule would require that the constructive purchase or sale
provide only one possible set of price terms.
The Blue Chip holding may limit but does not destroy the
existing and long-standing modifications to the Birnbaum doc-
trine. Future litigation will determine the scope and viability of the
exceptions and modifications to Birnbaum. The effect of the deci-
sion will be to bar many actions by persons who are damaged by
10b-5 violations but who are not actual purchasers or sellers of
securities. The decision reinstates consistency in determining who
can sue under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and prevents abuses by
plaintiffs who would bring nuisance suits. The case also will pre-
" Id. at 762.
,7 See note 3 supra.
" The three major categories are the injunction exception, the forced-seller
rule and the aborted-transaction rule.
"1 421 U.S. at 751 n.14.
[Vol. 80
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vent a flood of federal litigation and is justified by the long-
standing acceptance of the Birnbaum rule.
SCNTER
On March 30, 1976, the United States Supreme Court par-
tially answered one of the most difficult and confusing issues mate-
rial to a determination of whether rule 10b-5 has been violated. In
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,5' the Court held that scienter on the
part of the defendants must be proven before the plaintiff could
prevail in a private action for damages under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. "Scienter" was defined as "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.""' Although the Hochfelder
decision overrules cases which held that negligence was sufficient
for a violation of rule 10b-5 in a private action for damage," it does
not provide an answer as to whether scienter is a necessary element
for injunctive relief as opposed to damages," nor does it give a
comprehensive definition as to what "scienter" means. u The Court
noted that a negligence standard would "significantly broaden the
class of plaintiffs who [might] seek to impose liability upon ac-
countants and other experts who perform services or express opin-
ions with respect to matters under the Acts.""
Plaintiffs in Hochfelder were induced by the president of a
Chicago brokerage firm to invest funds in secret escrow accounts.
No escrow accounts existed, and the president took the funds for
his personal use. After the death of the president and the bank-
ruptcy of the brokerage firm, the plaintiffs brought suit under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 against Ernst and Ernst, the indepen-
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 193 n.12.
52 See, e.g., where negligence was held to be sufficient, White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
53 The Supreme Court states unequivocally in a footnote: "Since [Hochfelder
concerns an action for damages we also need not consider the question whether
scienter is a necessary element in an action of injunctive relief under § 10(b) and
rule lob-5." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). See Lowen-
fels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under 10(b) and Rule
lob-5: A Fascinating Paradox 33 Bus. LwYR. 789 (1978). Compare SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) with SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
11 See Hamimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LwYR. 147
(1976).
15 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
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dent public accountants who worked for the brokerage firm. They
charged the accounting firm with aiding and abetting because
Ernst and Ernst failed to discover that only the president could
open mail addressed to him at his firm even if such mail arrived
in his absence, and with negligence because they failed to investi-
gate adequately the internal control and accounting system of the
brokerage firm. 6
Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court, based his opin-
ion on the wording of the statute and the rule and on their limited
legislative and administrative histories. The Court emphasized the
words "manipulative," "contrivance," and "device" in section
10(b) which "made unmistakable a congressional intent to pro-
scribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence." 7 The
word "manipulative" implies "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artifically
affecting the price of securities."" The Court found that whenever
Congress chose to provide civil liability for negligence or mistake,
it did so specifically, and, further that it provided for procedural
restrictions, such as a short statute of limitations which does not
apply under section 10(b). 9 Although the Court did not discuss
what the necessary scienter would include (since no allegation of
fraud was made against Ernst and Ernst), one writer has suggested
that the Hochfelder definition would extend to situations similar
to common-law fraud under which a knowingly false statement
was sufficient-the necessary mental state would be conclusively
presumed. 0
Hochfelder, like Utramares v. Touche0 was designed to pro-
tect accountants and other professionals from plaintiffs whose
numbers could reach the thousands: "a thoughtless slip or blunder
. . . may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. '6 2
The Hochfelder case gives no indication that the court sought to
change the relationship between negligence and fraud which had
been established in cases where "heedlessness and reckless disre-
1' Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1115 (7th Cir. 1974).
37 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
55 Id.
' Id. at 207-08.
"' Hamimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and lOb-5, 32 Bus. LwY. 147, 148-
49 (1976).
,1 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
42 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
[Vol. 80
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gard of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention."
The Supreme Court has chosen to provide a standard that will
make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover in private 10b-5 actions
for damages. The Court has indicated that the language of the
securities acts will determine the development of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 and that further judicial opinions are likely to pay more
attention to the language of the acts than to the purposes behind
them.
MATERALT
In pleading and proving a 10b-5 case dealing with misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure, materiality is an essential element of
the plaintiffs case. Whether a fact is found to be material turns
on the circumstances of each case" and involves a "balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity."" The materiality test is concerned with the
reasonable investor and "those facts which affect the probable
future of the company and those which may affect the desire of
investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities."" The
standards for materiality are especially important since in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States67 the Supreme Court elimi-
nated the traditional limitation of reliance under rule 10b-5. There
the Supreme Court stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a fail-
ure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision. This
obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact
establish the requisite element of causation in fact."
Because of the language just quoted concerning what "a rea-
sonable investor might have considered,"" a conflict among cir-
u E.g. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-
19 (1938).
64 E.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974).
13 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849. (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
I6 d.
,T 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
" Id.
9
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cuits developed on the issue of whether materiality is to be deter-
mined by what a reasonable shareholder would, or merely might,
find important." The Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.7 sought to provide a clear definition of materiality
since a difference of opinion among the lower courts existed as to
whether information was material if it would be considered impor-
tant by a reasonable shareholder.72 In TSC the Court determined
that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote. '73 The Court clarified its misleading lan-
guage in Affiliated Ute concerning what a "reasonable investor
might have considered" by stating that in Affiliated Ute "it was
not necessary to articulate a precise definition of materiality, but
only to give a 'sense' of the notion [and that the] quoted language
did not purport to do more."'" Although the TSC case involved the
term "material" as it related to SEC rule 14a-9,7 it should end the
controversy concerning the proper test of materiality in 10b-5 ac-
tions as well. The TSC decision gives further evidence that the
Supreme Court is drawing a more distinct line between federal
protection of investors through disclosure requirements and state
supervision over the corporate entity. Federal securities laws now
offer more limited protection to shareholders.
1 See, e.g., Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330-32 (7th Cir.
1975), reu'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973).
71 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
1 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 443 (1976). See generally
The Standard of Materiality in the Context of the Proxy Rules 38 OHIO ST. L.J.
379 (1977).
426 U.S. at 449.
" Id. at 447 n.9.
r Rule 14a-9 provides in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communi-
cation, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier commu-
nication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting
or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1977).
[Vol. 80
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AVAmABirry OF OTHER REMEmIES
The Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green7'
held that the term "manipulative or deceptive" as used in section
10(b) of the 1934 Act does not encompass a breach of fiduciary
duty. In Santa Fe a short-form merger statute requiring neither the
consent of nor advance notice to minority shareholders pursuant
to section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law77 enabled Santa Fe
Industries, Incorporated, to obtain one hundred percent ownership
of Kirby Lumber Company. Minority shareholders of Kirby, who
were notified of the merger after its completion, attacked the
merger in federal court under rule 10b-5 rather than under the
appraisal remedy in the Delaware courts.18 The shareholders
argued that the value placed on the shares held by the minority
shareholders was so low as to amount to fraud and that the merger
lacked a proper business purpose." The complexity of mergers and
the large amounts of money involved make them frequent vehicles
for fraud." The Second Circuit found that rule 10b-5 reaches
"breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority share-
holders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclo-
sure."'
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and in doing
so gave considerable emphasis to the fact that minority sharehold-
ers have a remedy under the appraisal proceeding in Delaware and
that internal corporate matters are best left to the states. "Absent
a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to feder-
alize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state
policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."" Santa Fe
illustrates that although liability under rule 10b-5 of a corporation
and its management for acts of alleged corporate mismanagement
has not yet been precisely determined, the Supreme Court will
place limitations on actions brought under rule 10b-5 which could
have been brought under state statutes.
71 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1975).
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
11 430 U.S. at 468.
See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
1 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
82430 U.S. at 479.
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have shown that new limits
which are fixed and firm have been placed on rule 10b-5 actions.
The Court seems to want to limit the rule to the regulation of
securities and to leave corporate law to the states. The Court has
recognized that the elements of recovery in a 10b-5 action are
interdependent and must promote fairness and protect the integ-
rity of the market. The recent decisions of the Court provide a
starting point for a more understandable and rational framework
for the lower federal courts, corporations, and securities lawyers.
The Court seems to believe that the 10b-5 action has evolved be-
yond what was intended by its originators. In Blue Chip, the Court
stated:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn. Such growth may be quite consistent with the
congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judici-
ary in interpreting it [b]ut it would be disingenuous to suggest
that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law
with respect to Rule 10b-5.3
The Court has sought by these limitations to protect the business
community from plaintiffs who bring groundless claims or who
expect generous settlements for reasons unrelated to the lawsuits
brought.
0 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). See
Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342-43 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 80
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